First two paragraphs of the article, in lieu of an abstract: “What I am going to discuss in terms of response and responsivity is not just a special1kind of behavior with respect to the Other. Responding has rather to be understood as the genuine way in which we encounter the alien as alien. It will be shown that the experience of the Other, i.e., what Husserl calls Fremderfahrung, requires a new sort of responsive phenomenology. This kind of responsive phenomenology goes (...) beyond the traditional form of intentional phenomenology just as much as it leaves behind every sort of hermeneutics. Responding means more than intending or understanding. [note 1] In what follows I shall unfold some of the main features to be ascribed to responsive phenomenology, and in doing so I shall proceed in the following way. After having made some general remarks about the actual and the historical background of the alien, I shall first say something about the different meanings of the alien (Fremde) and about the place of the alien in our experience. The second part leads us to a turning-point where responsivity diverges from the basic underlying presuppositions to the phenomenology of intentional acts and to the hermeneutic interpretation of texts. In a third step I shall outline the key concepts of demand and response. I shall conclude by presenting some features of what I call logic of response.” Note 1: N.B. This text was first published as a Japanese version in Metaphysica: The Journal of Philosophy and Ethics (Dept. of Philosophy, Faculty of Letters, Osaka) 27 (1996), 1-15. A German version was published under the title “Antwort auf das Fremde: Grundzüge einer responsive Phänomenologie” in B. Waldenfels & I. Datmann (Eds.). Der Anspruch des Anderen: PerspekJiven phtinomenologischer Ethik. München: W. Fink., 1998. The English translation is based on a first draft made by Robb E. Eason, C. Edward Emmer, and Evan M. Selinger and revised by the author. (shrink)

Public attitudes concerning cognitive enhancements are significant for a number of reasons. They tell us about how socially acceptable these emerging technologies are considered to be, but they also provide a window into the ethical reasons that are likely to get traction in the ongoing debates about them. We thus see Conrad et al’s project of empirically investigating the effect of metaphors and context in shaping attitudes about cognitive enhancements as both interesting and important. We sketch what we suspect (...) is a central theme that runs through these public attitudes, but that Conrad el al’s paper elides. We were disappointed that they did not more directly explore the efficacy of frames and metaphors associated with the values of authenticity and self-expression. This seems like a missed opportunity. Based on the premise that individualistic values enjoy centrality in Western and especially North American culture (e.g. Taylor 1989), we hypothesize that metaphors and frames informed by those values will be especially effective in shaping public attitudes. That is, when various kinds of novel enhancement are described as allowing people to more fully express themselves, or as helping people overcome obstacles to being authentic and true to their inner sense of themselves, those enhancements will be considered justified, and their use more likely to be viewed as socially acceptable by the public. We support our contention by drawing on work by Elliott (2004, 2011, c.f. Kadlac 2018), and discuss how this study, and others modeled on it, might shed light on our hypothesis. (shrink)

continent. 1.1 : 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...) has been a defense against horror and madness. Kant's prohibition on speculative metaphysics such as dogmatic metaphysics and transcendental realism, on thinking beyond the imposition of transcendental and moral constraints, has been challenged by numerous figures proceeding him. One of the more interesting critiques of Kant comes from the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land stating, “Kant’s critical philosophy is the most elaborate fit of panic in the history of the Earth.” And while Alain Badiou would certainly be opposed to the libidinal investments of Land's Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, he is likewise critical of Kant's normative thought-bureaucracies: Kant is the one author for whom I cannot feel any kinship. Everything in him exasperates me, above all his legalism—always asking Quid Juris? Or ‘Haven’t you crossed the limit?’—combined, as in today’s United States, with a religiosity that is all the more dismal in that it is both omnipresent and vague. The critical machinery he set up has enduringly poisoned philosophy, while giving great succour to the academy, which loves nothing more than to rap the knuckles of the overambitious [….] That is how I understand the truth of Monique David-Menard’s reflections on the properly psychotic origins of Kantianism. I am persuaded that the whole of the critical enterprise is set up to to shield against the tempting symptom represented by the seer Swedenborg, or against ‘diseases of the head’, as Kant puts it. An entire nexus of the limits of reason and philosophy are set up here, namely that the critical philosophy not only defends thought from madness, philosophy from madness, and philosophy from itself, but that philosophy following the advent of the critical enterprise philosophy becomes auto-vampiric; feeding on itself to support the academy. Following Francois Laruelle's non-philosophical indictment of philosophy, we could go one step further and say that philosophy operates on the material of what is philosophizable and not the material of the external world. [1] Beyond this, the Kantian scheme of nestling human thinking between our limited empirical powers and transcendental guarantees of categorical coherence, forms of thinking which stretch beyond either appear illegitimate, thereby liquefying both pre-critical metaphysics and the ravings of the mad in the same critical acid. In rejecting the Kantian apparatus we are left with two entities – an unsure relation of thought to reality where thought is susceptible to internal and external breakdown and a reality with an uncertain sense of stability. These two strands will be pursued, against the sane-seal of post-Kantian philosophy by engaging the work of weird fiction authors H.P. Lovecraft and Thomas Ligotti. The absolute inhumanism of the formers universe will be used to describe a Shoggothic Materialism while the dream worlds of the latter will articulate the mad speculation of a Ventriloquil Idealism. But first we must address the relation of philosophy to madness as well as philosophy to weird fiction. /1/ – Philosophy and Madness There is nothing that the madness of men invents which is not either nature made manifest or nature restored. Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization. The moment I doubt whether an event that I recall actually took place, I bring the suspicion of madness upon myself: unless I am uncertain as to whether it was not a mere dream. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. 3. Madness is commonly thought of as moving through several well known cultural-historical shifts from madness as a demonic or otherwise theological force, to rationalization, to medicalization psychiatric and otherwise. Foucault's Madness and Civilization is well known for orientating madness as a form of exclusionary social control which operated by demarcating madness from reason. Yet Foucault points to the possibility of madness as the necessity of nature at least prior to the crushing weight of the church. Kant’s philosophy as a response to madness is grounded by his humanizing of madness itself. As Adrian Johnston points out in the early pages of Time Driven pre-Kantian madness meant humans were seized by demonic or angelic forces whereas Kantian madness became one of being too human. Madness becomes internalized, the external demonic forces become flaws of the individual mind. Foucault argues that, while madness is de-demonized it is also dehumanized during the Renaissance, as madmen become creatures neither diabolic nor totally human reduced to the zero degree of humanity. It is immediately clear why for Kant, speculative metaphysics must be curbed – with the problem of internal madness and without the external safeguards of transcendental conditions, there is nothing to formally separate the speculative capacities for metaphysical diagnosis from the mad ramblings of the insane mind – both equally fall outside the realm of practicality and quotidian experience. David-Menard's work is particularly useful in diagnosing the relation of thought and madness in Kant's texts. David-Menard argues that in Kant's relatively unknown “An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” as well as his later discussion of the Seer of Swedenborg, that Kant formulates madness primarily in terms of sensory upheaval or other hallucinatory theaters. She writes: “madness is an organization of thought. It is made possible by the ambiguity of the normal relation between the imaginary and the perceived, whether this pertains to the order of sensation or to the relations between our ideas” Kant's fascination with the Seer forces Kant between the pincers of “aesthetic reconciliation” – namely melancholic withdrawal – and “a philosophical invention” – namely the critical project. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis is a combination and reversal of Kant's split, where an aesthetic over engagement with the world entails prolific conceptual invention. Their embrace of madness, however, is of course itself conceptual despite all their rhizomatic maneuvers. Though they move with the energy of madness, Deleuze and Guattari save the capacity of thought from the fangs of insanity by imbuing materiality itself with the capacity for thought. Or, as Ray Brassier puts it, “Deleuze insists, it is necessary to absolutize the immanence of this world in such a way as to dissolve the transcendent disjunction between things as we know them and as they are in themselves”. That is, whereas Kant relied on the faculty of judgment to divide representation from objectivity Deleuze attempts to flatten the whole economy beneath the juggernaut of ontological univocity. Speculation, as a particularly useful form of madness, might fall close to Deleuze and Guattari’s shaping of philosophy into a concept producing machine but is different in that it is potentially self destructive – less reliant on the stability of its own concepts and more adherent to exposing a particular horrifying swath of reality. Speculative madness is always a potential disaster in that it acknowledges little more than its own speculative power with the hope that the gibbering of at least a handful of hysterical brains will be useful. Pre-critical metaphysics amounts to madness, though this may be because the world itself is mad while new attempts at speculative metaphysics, at post-Kantian pre-critical metaphysics, are well aware of our own madness. Without the sobriety of the principle of sufficient reason we have a world of neon madness: “we would have to conceive what our life would be if all the movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, all the smells, the tastes, all the light – of the earth and elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an instant – like an atrocious screaming tumult of things”. Speculative thought may be participatory in the screaming tumult of the world or, worse yet, may produce its spectral double. Against theology or reason or simply commonsense, the speculative becomes heretical. Speculation, as the cognitive extension of the horrorific sublime should be met with melancholic detachment. Whereas Kant's theoretical invention, or productivity of thought, is self -sabotaging, since the advent of the critical project is a productivity of thought which then delimits the engine of thought at large either in dogmatic gestures or non-systematizable empirical wondrousness. The former is celebrated by the fiction of Thomas Ligotti whereas the latter is espoused by the tales of H.P. Lovecraft. /2/ – Weird Fiction and Philosophy. Supernatural horror, in all its eerie constructions, enables a reader to taste treats inconsistent with his personal welfare. Thomas Ligotti Songs of a Dead Dreamer. I choose weird stories because they suit my inclination best—one of my strongest and most persistent wishes being to achieve,momentarily, the illusion of some strange suspension or violation of the galling limitations of time, space, and natural law which forever imprison us and frustrate our curiosity about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius of our sight and analysis H.P. Lovecraft. “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction” Lovecraft states that his creation of a story is to suspend natural law yet, at the same time, he indexes the tenuousness of such laws, suggesting the vast possibilities of the cosmic. The tension that Lovecraft sets up between his own fictions and the universe or nature is reproduced within his fictions in the common theme of the unreliable narrator; unreliable precisely because they are either mad or what they have witnessed questions the bounds of material reality. In “The Call of Cthulhu” Lovecraft writes: The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age. Despite Lovecraft's invocations of illusion, he is not claiming that his fantastic creations such as the Old Ones are supernatural but, following Joshi, are only ever supernormal. One can immediately see that instead of nullifying realism Lovecraft in fact opens up the real to an unbearable degree. In various letters and non-fictional statements Lovecraft espoused strictly materialist tenets, ones which he borrowed from Hugh Elliot namely the uniformity of law, the denial of teleology and the denial of non-material existence. Lovecraft seeks to explore the possibilities of such a universe by piling horror upon horror until the fragile brain which attempts to grasp it fractures. This may be why philosophy has largely ignored weird fiction – while Deleuze and Guattari mark the turn towards weird fiction and Lovecraft in particular, with the precursors to speculative realism as well as contemporary related thinkers have begun to view Lovecraft as making philosophical contributions. Lovecraft's own relation to philosophy is largely critical while celebrating Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. This relationship of Lovecraft to philosophy and philosophy to Lovecraft is coupled with Lovecraft's habit of mercilessly destroying the philosopher and the figure of the academic more generally in his work, a destruction which is both an epistemological destruction and an ontological destruction. Thomas Ligotti's weird fiction which he has designated as a kind of “confrontational escapism” might be best described in the following quote from one of his shortstories, “The human phenomenon is but the sum of densely coiled layers of illusion each of which winds itself on the supreme insanity. That there are persons of any kind when all there can be is mindless mirrors laughing and screaming as they parade about in an endless dream”. Whereas Lovecraft's weirdness draws predominantly from the abyssal depths of the uncharted universe, Ligotti's existential horror focuses on the awful proliferation of meaningless surfaces that is, the banal and every day function of representation. In an interview, Ligotti states: We don't even know what the world is like except through our sense organs, which are provably inadequate. It's no less the case with our brains. Our whole lives are motored along by forces we cannot know and perceptions that are faulty. We sometimes hear people say that they're not feeling themselves. Well, who or what do they feel like then? This is not to say that Ligotti sees nothing beneath the surface but that there is only darkness or blackness behind it, whether that surface is on the cosmological level or the personal. By addressing the implicit and explicit philosophical issues in Ligotti's work we will see that his nightmarish take on reality is a form of malevolent idealism, an idealism which is grounded in a real, albeit dark and obscure materiality. If Ligotti's horrors ultimately circle around mad perceptions which degrade the subject, it takes aim at the vast majority of the focus of continental philosophy. While Lovecraft's acidic materialism clearly assaults any romantic concept of being from the outside, Ligotti attacks consciousness from the inside: Just a little doubt slipped into the mind, a little trickle of suspicion in the bloodstream, and all those eyes of ours, one by one, open up to the world and see its horror [...] Not even the solar brilliance of a summer day will harbor you from horror. For horror eats the light and digests it into darkness. Clearly, the weird fiction of Lovecraft and Ligotti amount to a anti-anthrocentric onslaught against the ramparts of correlationist continental philosophy. /3/ – Shoggothic Materialism or the Formless Formless protoplasm able to mock and reflect all forms and organs and processes—viscous agglutinations of bubbling cells—rubbery fifteen-foot spheroids infinitely plastic and ductile—slaves of suggestion, builders of cities—more and more sullen, more and more intelligent, more and more amphibious, more and more imitative—Great God! What madness made even those blasphemous Old Ones willing to use and to carve such things? H.P. Lovecraft. “At the Mountains of Madness” On the other hand, affirming that the universe resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or spit. Georges Bataille. “Formless”. The Shoggoths feature most prominently in H.P. Lovecraft's shortstory “At the Mountains of Madness” where they are described in the following manner: It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any subway train – a shapeless congeries of protoplasmic bubbles, faintly self -luminous, and with myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-forming as pustules of greenish light all over the tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so evilly free of all litter. The term is a litmus test for materialism itself as the Shoggoth is an amorphous creature. The Shoggoths were living digging machines bio engineered by the Elder Things, and their protoplasmic bodies being formed into various tools by their hypnotic powers. The Shoggoths eventually became self aware and rose up against their masters in an ultimately failed rebellion. After the Elder Ones retreated into the oceans leaving the Shoggoths to roam the frozen wastes of the Antarctic. The onto-genesis of the Shoggoths and their gross materiality, index the horrifyingly deep time of the earth a concept near and dear to Lovecraft's formulation of horror as well as the fear of intelligences far beyond, and far before, the ascent of humankind on earth and elsewhere. The sickly amorphous nature of the Shoggoths invade materialism at large, where while materiality is unmistakably real ie not discursive, psychological, or otherwise overly subjectivist, it questions the relation of materialism to life. As Eugene Thacker writes: The Shoggoths or Elder Things do not even share the same reality with the human beings who encounter them—and yet this encounter takes place, though in a strange no-place that is neither quite that of the phenomenal world of the human subject or the noumenal world of an external reality. Amorphous yet definitively material beings are a constant in Lovecraft's tales. In his tale “The Dream-Quest of Unknown Kadatth” Lovecraft describes Azathoth as, “that shocking final peril which gibbers unmentionably outside the ordered universe,” that, “last amorphous blight of nethermost confusion which blashphemes and bubbles at the centre of all infinity,” who, “gnaws hungrily in inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond time”. Azathoth's name may have multiple origins but the most striking is the alchemy term azoth which is both a cohesive agent and a acidic creation pointing back to the generative and the decayed. The indistinction of generation and degradation materially mirrors the blur between the natural and the unnatural as well as life and non-life. Lovecraft speaks of the tension between the natural and the unnatural is his short story “The Unnameable.” He writes, “if the psychic emanations of human creatures be grotesque distortions, what coherent representation could express or portray so gibbous and infamous a nebulousity as the spectre of a malign, chaotic perversion, itself a morbid blasphemy against Nature?”. Lovecraft explores exactly the tension outlined at the beginning of this chapter, between life and thought. At the end of his short tale Lovecraft compounds the problem as the unnameable is described as “a gelatin—a slime—yet it had shapes, a thousand shapes of horror beyond all memory”. Deleuze suggests that becoming-animal is operative throughout Lovecraft's work, where narrators feel themselves reeling at their becoming non-human or of being the anomalous or of becoming atomized. Following Eugene Thacker however, it may be far more accurate to say that Lovecraft's tales exhibit not a becoming-animal but a becoming-creature. Where the monstrous breaks the purportedly fixed laws of nature, the creature is far more ontologically ambiguous. The nameless thing is an altogether different horizon for thought. The creature is either less than animal or more than animal – its becoming is too strange for animal categories and indexes the slow march of thought towards the bizarre. This strangeness is, as aways, some indefinite swirling in the category of immanence and becoming. Bataille begins “The Labyrinth” with the assertion that being, to continue to be, is becoming. More becoming means more being hence the assertion that Bataille's barking dog is more than the sponge. This would mean that the Shoggotth is altogether too much being, too much material in the materialism. Bataille suggests that there is an immanence between the eater and the eaten, across the species and never within them. That is, despite the chaotic storm of immanence there must remain some capacity to distinguish the gradients of becoming without reliance upon, or at least total dependence upon, the powers of intellection to parse the universe into recognizable bits, properly digestible factoids. That is, if we undo Deleuze's aforementioned valorization of sense which, for his variation of materialism, performed the work of the transcendental, but refuse to reinstate Kant's transcendental disjunction between thing and appearance, then it must be a quality of becoming-as-being itself which can account for the discernible nature of things by sense. In an interview with Peter Gratton, Jane Bennett formulates the problem thusly: What is this strange systematicity proper to a world of Becoming? What, for example, initiates this congealing that will undo itself? Is it possible to identify phases within this formativity, plateaus of differentiation? If so, do the phases/plateaus follow a temporal sequence? Or, does the process of formation inside Becoming require us to theorize a non-chronological kind of time? I think that your student’s question: “How can we account for something like iterable structures in an assemblage theory?” is exactly the right question. Philosophy has erred too far on the side of the subject in the subject-object relation and has furthermore, lost the very weirdness of the non-human. Beyond this, the madness of thought need not override. /4/ - Ventriloquial Idealism or the Externality of Thought My aim is the opposite of Lovecraft's. He had an appreciation for natural scenery on earth and wanted to reach beyond the visible in the universe. I have no appreciation for natural scenery and want the objective universe to be a reflection of a character. Thomas Ligotti. “Devotees of Decay and Desolation.” Unless life is a dream, nothing makes sense. For as a reality, it is a rank failure [….] Horror is more real than we are. Thomas Ligotti. “Professor Nobody's Little Lectures on Supernatural Horror”. Thomas Ligotti's tales are rife with mannequins, puppets, and other brainless entities which of replace the valorized subject of philosophy – that of the free thinking human being. His tales such as “The Dream of the Manikin” aim to destroy the rootedness of consciousness. James Trafford has connected the anti-egoism of Ligotti to Thomas Metzinger – where the self is at best an illusion and we plead desperately for someone else to acknowledge that we are real. Trafford has stated it thus, “Life is played out as an inescapable puppet show, an endless dream in which the puppets are generally unaware that they are trapped within a mesmeric dance of whose mechanisms they know nothing and over which they have no control”. An absolute materialism, for Ligotti, implies an alienation of the idea which leads to a ventriloquil idealism. As Ligotti notes in an interview, “the fiasco and nightmare of existence, the particular fiasco and nightmare of human existence, the sense that people are puppets of powers they cannot comprehend, etc.” And then further elaborates that,“[a]ssuming that anything has to exist, my perfect world would be one in which everyone has experienced the annulment of his or her ego. That is, our consciousness of ourselves as unique individuals would entirely disappear”. The externality of the idea leads to the unfortunate consequence of consciousness eating at itself through horror which, for Ligotti, is more real than reality and goes beyond horror-as-affect. Beyond this, taking together with the unreality of life and the ventriloquizing of subjectivity, Ligotti's thought becomes an idealism in which thought itself is alien and ultimately horrifying. The role of human thought and the relation of non-relation of horror to thought is not completely clear in Ligotti's The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. Ligotti argues in his The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,that the advent of thought is a mistake of nature and that horror is being in the sense that horror results from knowing too much. Yet, at the same time, Ligotti seems to suggest that thought separates us from nature whereas, for Lovecraft, thought is far less privileged – mind is just another manifestation of the vital principal, it is just another materialization of energy. In his brilliant “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism” Iain Grant rallies against the negative definition of dogmatism and the transcendental, and suggests that negatively defining both over-focuses on conditions of access and subjectivism at the expense of the real or nature. With Schelling, who is Grant's champion against the subjectivist bastions of both Fichte and Kant, Ligotti's idealism could be taken as a transcendental realism following from an ontological realism. Yet the transcendental status of Ligotti's thought move towards a treatment of the transcendental which may threaten to leave beyond its realist ground. Ligotti states: Belief in the supernatural is only superstition. That said, a sense of the supernatural, as Conrad evidenced in Heart of Darkness, must be admitted if one's inclination is to go to the limits of horror. It is the sense of what should not be- the sense of being ravaged by the impossible. Phenomenally speaking, the super-natural may be regarded as the metaphysical counterpart of insanity, a transcendental correlative of a mind that has been driven mad. Again, Ligotti equates madness with thought, qualifying both as supernatural while remaining less emphatic about the metaphysical dimensions of horror. The question becomes one of how exactly the hallucinatory realm of the ideal relates to the black churning matter of Lovecraft's chaos of elementary particles. In his tale “I Have a Special Plan for This World” Ligotti formulates thus: A: There is no grand scheme of things. B: If there were a grand scheme of things, the fact – the fact – that we are not equipped to perceive it, either by natural or supernatural means, is a nightmarish obscenity. C: The very notion of a grand scheme of things is a nightmarish obscenity. Here Ligotti is not discounting metaphysics but implying that if it does exist the fact that we are phenomenologically ill-equipped to perceive that it is nightmarish. For Ligotti, nightmare and horror occur within the circuit of consciousness whereas for Lovecraft the relation between reality and mind is less productive on the side of mind. It is easier to ascertain how the Kantian philosophy is a defense against the diseases of the head as Kant armors his critical enterprise from too much of the world and too much of the mind. The weird fiction of both Lovecraft and Ligotti demonstrates that there is too much of both feeding into one another in a way that corrodes the Kantian schema throughly, breaking it down into a dead but still ontologically potentiated nigredo. The haunting, terrifying fact of Ligotti's idealism is that the transcendental motion which brought thought to matter, while throughly material and naturalized, brings with it the horror that thought cannot be undone without ending the material that bears it either locally or completely. Thought comes from an elsewhere and an elsewhen being-in-thought. The unthinkable outside thought is as maddening as the unthought engine of thought itself within thought which doesn't exist except for the mind, the rotting décor of the brain. /5/ - Hyperstitional Transcendental Paranoia or Self -Expelled Thought Weird fiction has been given some direct treatment in philosophy in the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land. Nick Land along with others in the 1990s created the Cyber Culture Research Unit as well as the research group Hyperstition. The now defunct hyperstitional website, an outgrowth of the Cyber Culture Research Unit, defined hyperstition in the following fourfold: 1-Element of effective culture that makes itself real. 2-Fictional quantity functional as a time-traveling device. 3-Coincidence intensifier. 4-Call to the Old Ones. The distinctively Lovecraftian character of hyperstition is hard to miss as is its Deleuzo-Guattarian roots. In the opening pages of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari write, “We have been criticized for over-quoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into”. The indisinction of literature and philosophy mirrors the mess of being and knowing as post-correlationist philosophy, where philosophy tries to make itself real where literature, especially the weird, aims itself at the brain-circuit of horror. The texts of both Lovecraft and Ligotti work through horror as epistemological plasticity meeting with proximity as well as the deep time of Lovecraft and the glacially slow time of paranoia in Ligotti. Against Deleuze, and following Brassier, we cannot allow the time of consciousness, the Bergsonian time of the duree, to override natural time, but instead acknowledge that it is an unfortunate fact of existence as a thinking being. Horror-time, the time of consciousness, with all its punctuated moments and drawn out terrors, cannot compare to the deep time of non-existence both in the unreachable past and the unknown future. The crystalline cogs of Kant's account of experience as the leading light for the possibility of metaphysics must be throughly obliterated. His gloss of experience in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics could not be more sterile: Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments which the understanding makes entirely out of sensuous intuitions are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in sensuous intuition [....] Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Here it is difficult to dismiss the queasiness that Kant's legalism induces upon sight for both Badiou and David-Menard. Kant's thought becomes, as Foucault says when reflecting on Sade's text in relation to nature, “the savage abolition of itself”. For Badiou, Kant's philosophy simply closes off too much of the outside, freezing the world of thought in an all too limited formalism. Critical philosophy is simply the systematized quarantine on future thinking, on thinking which would threaten the formalism which artificially grants thought its own coherency in the face of madness. Even the becoming-mad of Deleuze, while escaping the rumbling ground, makes grounds for itself, mad grounds but grounds which are thinkable in their affect. The field of effects allows for Deleuze's aesthetic and radical empiricism, in which effects and/or occasions make up the material of the world to be thought as a chaosmosis of simulacra. Given a critique of an empiricism of aesthetics, of the image, it may be difficult to justify an attack on Kantian formalism with the madness of literature, which does not aim to make itself real but which we may attempt to make real. That is, how do Lovecraft's and Ligotti's materials, as materials for philosophy to work on, differ from either the operative formalisms of Kant or the implicitly formalized images of Deleuzian empiricism? It is simply that such texts do not aim to make themselves real, and make claims to the real which are more alien to us than familiar, which is why their horror is immediately more trustworthy. This is the madness which Blanchot discusses in The Infinite Conversation through Cervantes and his knight – the madness of book-life, of the perverse unity of literature and life a discussion which culminates in the discussion of one of the weird's masters, that of Kafka. The text is the knowing of madness, since madness, in its moment of becoming-more-mad, cannot be frozen in place but by the solidifications of externalizing production. This is why Foucault ends his famous study with works of art. Furthermore extilligence, the ability to export the products of our maligned brains, is the companion of the attempts to export, or discover the possibility of intelligences outside of our heads, in order for philosophy to survive the solar catastrophe. To borrow again from Deleuze, writing is inseparable from becoming. The mistake is to believe that madness is reabsorbed by extilligence, by great works, or that it could be exorcised by the expelling of thought into the inorganic or differently organic. Going out of our heads does not guarantee we will no longer mean we cannot still go out of our minds. This is simply because of the outside, of matter, or force, or energy, or thing-in-itself, or Schopenhauerian Will. In Lovecraft’s “The Music of Erich Zahn” an “impoverished student of metaphysics” becomes intrigued by strange viol music coming from above his room. After meeting the musician the student discovers that each night he plays frantic music at a window in order to keep some horridness at bay, some “impenetrable darkness with chaos and pandemonium”. The aesthetic defenses provided by the well trained brain can bear the hex of matter for so long, the specter of unalterability within it which too many minds obliterate, collapsing everything before the thought of thought as thinkable or at least noetically mutable on our own terms. Transcendental paranoia is the concurrent nightmare and promise of Paul Humphrey's work, of being literally out of our minds. It is the gothic counterpart of thinking non-conceptually but also of thinking never belonging to any instance of purportedly solid being. As Bataille stated, “At the boundary of that which escapes cohesion, he who reflects within cohesion realizes there is no longer any room for him” Thought is immaterial only to the degree that it is inhuman, it is a power that tries, always with failure, to ascertain its own genesis. Philosophy, if it can truly return to the great outdoors, if it can leave behind the dead loop of the human skull, must recognize not only the non-priority of human thought, but that thought never belongs to the brain that thinks it, thought comes from somewhere else. To return to the train image from the beginning “a locomotive rolling on the surface of the earth is the image of continuous metamorphosis” this is the problem of thought, and of thinking thought, of being no longer able to isolate thought, with only a thought-formed structure. [1] One of the central tenets of Francois Laruelle's non-philosophy is that philosophy has traditionally operated on material already presupposed as thinkable instead of trying to think the real in itself. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, remains fixated on transcendental synthesis which shatters immanence into an empirical datum and an a prori factum which are then fused by a third thing such as the ego. For a critical account of Laruelle's non-philosophy see Ray Brassier's Nihil Unbound. (shrink)

RELAÇÃO E EFEITOS BIOQUÍMICO-NUTRICIONAIS SOBRE A RETENÇÃO DE PLACENTA EM VACAS -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim [email protected] ou [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- •__1. Retenção de placenta -/- A retenção da placenta é uma anomalia reprodutiva de diferentes origens. Nos bovinos, caracteriza-se pela não expulsão dos anexos dos sacos placentários nas primeiras 12 horas após o parto. Os principais fatores que podem causar a retenção de placenta são: a) dificuldades no processo normal (...) do parto (distorcias, partos gêmeos, etc.), b) distúrbios hormonais, c) estresse intenso (subnutrição, falta de movimento, mau manejo do período de transição), d) doenças infecciosas, e) prolongamento do processo de gestação e f) fatores hereditários (KANKOFER, et al. 2005). Na apresentação das retenções de placenta considera-se a seguinte ordem: a primeira opção é de tipo infeccioso, portanto, deve-se descartar agentes indutores de aborto e de retenção infecciosa de placenta como: Brucella (principal causa de aborto), Leptospira, Neospora, etc. Logo, a causa mais frequente de retenções de placenta, corresponde a intervenções muito precoces na atenção do parto. Isto faz com que não haja descolamento normal da placenta, terminando o parto. Esta segunda causa seria de origem mecânica ou traumática ao induzir o rasgo incompleto da unidade cotilédone-caruncular. A terceira causa de retenção de placenta são desequilíbrios nutricionais (FRAZER, 2005; GORDON, 1996), entre os quais podemos citar: 1.1 Deficiência de energia Dentro do aspecto nutricional este é um dos fatores que tem grande importância devido à deficiência na dieta de energia, levando a um Balanço Energético Negativo (BEN), já que o animal se vê obrigado a mobilizar reservas (CONTRERAS, 1998). Alterações metabólicas que ocorrem, causam stress no animal, stress que é refletido em problemas reprodutivos como a retenção da placenta que é dada pelas alterações que levam ao não desprendimento do cotilédone das criptas carunculares ou por baixa resposta do endométrio que nos processos de contração produz isquemia temporária na carúncula. Outra razão associada é que quando têm-se uma baixa no consumo de energia também se reduz a produção de glicose, a médio prazo o colesterol não é sintetizado e, portanto, a produção de estrogénios diminui, uma vez que não haverá excedentes energéticos que possam sintetizar o precursor da hormona esteroide, que a mesma placenta segrega ocorrendo uma atonia uterina onde não haverá contratilidade do útero na hora do parto o que leva à retenção de placenta, como sequela imediata ao estresse do parto sob grave BEN. 1.2 Deficiências de minerais Uma das causas da retenção de placenta é o déficit de alguns nutrientes no pré-parto, dentro dos quais se encontram o iodo e o selênio. Por isso, um dos sinais que evidenciaria a deficiência de selênio seria a retenção da placenta. Talvez a forragem que se está oferecendo ao animal seja afetada pela estação do ano que determina os aumentos das deficiências nos meses de inverno, e a carência deve-se não só à disponibilidade na planta, mas também à disponibilidade e mobilidade do mineral no solo. A presença de altas concentrações de selênio em tecidos como o ovário, a placenta, a hipófise e as glândulas adrenais é uma manifestação da importância do conhecimento de uma possível deficiência do mesmo e suas consequências na área reprodutiva. A deficiência de selênio afeta a função da tireoide, uma vez que demonstrou-se que a concentração de tiroxina (T4), produzida pela tiroide em animais com deficiência de selênio, está aumentada no plasma enquanto a triiodotironina (T3) está diminuída. Isto deve-se à ação da enzima tipo I, iodotironina-5-deiodinase, que contém selênio na sua molécula, o que explica a diminuição da função hormonal da glândula tiroide que pode ser encontrada em animais com deficiência de selênio. Podem ser tomadas medidas preventivas para evitar problemas de retenção da placenta com a administração parentérica (IM) de 5 a 10 mg de selênio 1 mês antes do parto, podendo também evitar-se este fenômeno através da administração do selênio orgânico do tipo seleniometionina. Isto eleva o nível de enzima antioxidante glutationa peroxidase pelo menos por 3 meses, este tempo de proteção favorece a redução na retenção da placenta, uma vez que o parto é o momento de maior geração de radicais livres de oxigênio, cujo efeito nocivo é neutralizado pela glutationa peroxidase que é rica em selênio. A disponibilidade de selênio nas forrageiras brasileira é deficiente, uma vez que esse elemento encontrado no solo e em pouquíssimas quantidades é lixiviado pelas condições naturais. O selênio ainda possui funções essenciais no trato reprodutivo de touros e vacas, dentre as funções nós touros que mais se destacam estão a função antioxidante, que protege a membrana lipídica dos espermatozoides e também a função estrutural dos mesmos, uma vez que é estrutura fixa intermediária da membrana e das mitocôndrias dos espermatozoides. Quando há deficiência de selênio nos machos, a gametogênese fica comprometida e os espermatozoides apresentam-se com anormalidades em sua estrutura e elevam-se as porcentagens de oligozoospermia e de necrozoospermia. Nas vacas, a função do selênio também é antioxidante e sua ação evita o aparecimento dos cistos nós ovários, que são folículos que, por alguma intempérie, não ovularam naturalmente e normalmente. Estudos feitos por Julian et al., demonstraram que a inserção do selênio e a vitamina E na dieta das vacas gestantes reduziram indubitavelmente a incidência de retenção de placenta nas vacas (tabela 1). Foram testadas 193 vacas com quantidades variáveis de selênio divididas em grupo de controle e grupo tratado, os resultados demonstram que o selênio é essencial para que se reduza o número de placentas retidas por vacas. Tabela 1: Efeito do selênio e da vitamina E na prevenção de retenção de placenta -/- Selênio na dieta (mg/kg) Grupo de controle Grupo de tratamento* N° de vacas Placentas retidas % N° de vacas Placentas retidas % 0,04 39 16 41 53 6 11,3 0,02 23 12 52 37 4 10,8 0,035 9 7 77,7 14 0 0 — 9 6 66,7 9 0 0 Total 80 41 51,2 113 10 88 * Injeção IM de 50 mg de selenito de sódio e 600 UI de acetato de alfa-tocoferol. 40 – 20 dias ou 20 dias pré-parto. Fonte: JULIEN et al., 1976. Para oferecer alimentos ricos em selênio, basta que o criador utilize farelos/rações com ingredientes como a semente de girassol, o arroz ou o próprio trigo, desde que a quantidade presente na ração supra as necessidades e exigências dos animais para seus processos fisiológicos. Todavia, vale salientar que o selênio é um elemento químico encontrado no solo, e que a quantidade do mesmo nesses ingredientes implica no manejo correto do solo onde foram cultivados. Outro elemento muito importante é o iodo em si, já que sua deficiência influenciará sobre o comportamento sexual produzindo-se supressão ou depressão dos níveis de estrogênio, também pode diminuir a incidência de partos prolongados, cuja pior consequência é o aumento de placentas retidas. A importância de suplementar os animais com este mineral nas zonas afastadas do mar mostra uma notável melhoria nas taxas de concepção e redução da retenção de placenta. O iodo é efetivamente absorvido na circulação sanguínea, a partir do qual passa para a glândula tireoide ou é eliminado através da urina. A tireoide contém grande quantidade de iodo na forma de tiroglobulina. A partir das tironinas é sintetizado T3 e T4. A deficiência do mineral produz bócio que consiste em uma hipertrofia da tireoide, uma vez que o órgão tenta compensar a falta de iodo tornando mais eficiente seu mecanismo para captá-lo. A tireoide produz compostos hormonais que têm uma característica única no organismo, é que em sua composição entra o iodo. Isto é um fato importante, porque se o organismo não tiver iodo, a tireoide não pode produzir hormonas da tireóideas (T3 e T4). O iodo é um dos elementos essenciais. Poder-se-ia viver com um número limitado de elementos, é possível viver sem níquel, sem cádmio, mas impossível viver sem iodo. O iodo é um elemento químico encontrado no mar, sendo assim, os animais marinhos como peixes, moluscos, lulas, etc. são notadamente ricos em iodo. Para suprir as necessidades de iodo das vacas, bem como de quaisquer outra espécie doméstica, o criador poderá obter por oferecer uma ração industrial que contenha o iodo necessário que supra as necessidades e exigências das vacas, ou poderá optar pela utilização de farinha de peixe, por exemplo, como fonte de iodo sustentável e de baixo valor comercial. Uma deficiência de cobre e zinco nos níveis séricos pode causar a retenção de placenta, sendo assim, deve-se ter em conta a idade do animal, já que em menor idade há maior probabilidade de ocorrer o problema (AKAR, et al. 2005). Os hormônios da tireoide têm múltiplas funções. Atualmente sabe-se que a mais importante delas é intervir no desenvolvimento do sistema nervoso, participa na calorigênese e na regulação do consumo de oxigênio, por essa razão, processos de elevada troca de oxigênio requerem elevados níveis circulantes de hormonas tireóideas, tal como acontece no parto, onde o miométrio e a musculatura abdominal sofrem constantes contrações para a expulsão do feto e da placenta. Por esta razão, deficiências de iodo gerarão menor síntese de T3 e T4, dando lugar a menor regulação da troca de oxigênio e, com isso, a uma provável retenção de placenta por esgotamento após a contração muscular. O cobre usado em quantidades adequadas nas rações dos animais de produção, pode ser um ótimo promotor de crescimento, sendo assim, é indispensável na dieta das vacas e quaisquer outros animais de criação, ele é encontrado em diversos cereais, sendo a aveia o maior destaque que o produtor pode obter para oferecer a seus animais, ou mesmo com uma ração balanceada. O zinco é um microelemento imprescindível na vida da vaca, pode ser oferecido através de ração, em pasto ou por meio de cereais como o amendoim ou a castanha do caju. Esses minerais supracitados (selênio, iodo, cobre e zinco), podem ser oferecidos, além do método mais tradicional que é por meio de alimentos concentrados (ração), por meio dos alimentos volumosos que são as forrageiras como os capins. Para tanto, o criador deve optar por uma variedade que consiga, por meio da sua fisiologia vegetal, apresentar quantidades aceitáveis desses minerais em sua matéria verde ou seca. As vacas, bem como as demais espécies de produção, possuem exigências específicas de minerais, vitaminas, carboidratos, proteínas, etc. como já supracitado. As quantidades dos minerais (tabela 2) presentes no alimento fornecido devem ser respeitadas para que não haja problemas maiores como Intoxicações. Tabela 2: Exigências minerais para vacas de corte e leite -/- Mineral Vacas de corte em gestação (mg/kg) Vacas leiteiras em transição (mg/kg) Vacas leiteiras em lactação (mg/kg) Selênio 0,10 0,3 0,3 Iodo 0,50 0,4 – 0,5 0,34 – 0,88 Cobre 10 12 – 18 9 – 16 Zinco 30 21 – 30 43 – 73 Fonte: BARBOSA & SOUZA, 2003. 1.3 Fitoestrógenos Outra possível causa da retenção placentária é a manifestação do chamado "Síndrome Hiperestrogênico", que pode resultar no consumo de grandes quantidades de fitoestrogênios provenientes da alfafa, trevos e outras plantas ricas em estrogênios de origem vegetal. Os fitoestrogênios, tais como cumarinas e isoflavonas, são substâncias que têm a capacidade de ligar-se aos receptores endógenos de estrogênios, provocando nos animais que os ingerem em grandes quantidades, alterações reprodutivas por hiperestrogenização. Nos bovinos foram observados casos de ninfomania, hiperemia vulvar, quistos ováricos, hiperplasia das mas e do útero, prolapsos da vagina, relaxamento dos ligamentos pélvicos e até a esterilidade. O fitoestrogênio encontra-se presente em maior quantidade na alfafa (coumestrol), que é 30 a 100 vezes mais potente do que outros fitoestrogênios presentes em vegetais como as isoflavonas. Estas substâncias encontram-se naturalmente em pequenas quantidades nas forragens e possuem efeitos antimicrobianos e fungicidas. A diferença com os estrogênios provenientes de ervas ou fitoestrogênios, representados pela genisteína, genistina e coumestrol presentes em muitas plantas leguminosas, e estrogênio endógeno, como 17-beta estradiol, estrona e outros compostos esteroides, é que os estrogênios endógenos são eliminados através da urina, das fezes ou são biologicamente desativados e não são armazenados como os fitoestrogênios. O possível efeito direto dos fitoestrogênios sobre a retenção da placenta, seria o bloqueio dos receptores para os estrogênios naturais, perdendo esta fonte de estímulo contrátil que resulta na expulsão da placenta. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- AKAR, Yaşar; YILDIZ, Hamit. Concentrations of some minerals in cows with retained placenta and abortion. Turkish Journal of Veterinary and Animal Sciences, v. 29, n. 5, p. 1157-1162, 2005. BARBOSA, Fabiano Alvim; SOUZA, G. M. Efeito dos microminerais na reprodução de bovinos. Belo Horizonte: Portal Agronomia, 2009. BOLAND, M. P. Efectos nutricionales en la reproducción del ganado. XXXI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2003. CONTRERAS, Pedro A. Síndrome de movilización grasa en vacas lecheras al inicio de la lactancia y sus efectos en salud y producción de los rebaños. Archivos de medicina veterinaria, v. 30, n. 2, p. 17-27, 1998. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Reprodução Animal: Fisiologia do Parto e da Lactação Animal. Disponível em:-. Acesso em: Março de 2020. DE LUCA, Leonardo J. Nutrición y fertilidad en el ganado lechero. XXXVI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2008. FRAZER, Grant S. Bovine theriogenology. Veterinary Clinics: Food Animal Practice, v. 21, n. 2, p. xiii-xiv, 2005. GORDON, Ian. Controlled reproduction in farm animals series. Nova Iorque: CAB International, 1996. JULIEN, W. E.; CONRAD, H. R.; MOXON, A. L. Selenium and vitamin E and incidence of retained placenta in parturient dairy cows. II. Prevention in commercial herds with prepartum treatment. Journal of dairy science, v. 59, n. 11, p. 1960-1962, 1976. KANKOFER, M.; LIPKO, J.; ZDUNCZYK, S. Total antioxidant capacity of bovine spontaneously released and retained placenta. Pathophysiology, v. 11, n. 4, p. 215-219, 2005. -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Belo Jardim, 29 de março de 2020 . (shrink)

RESUMO A inseminação artificial em tempo fixo (IATF) é uma das biotecnologias de reprodução mais estudadas dos últimos anos, e a busca pelo equilíbrio entre a fisiologia animal e o controle hormonal fomenta uma série de estudos. Sendo assim, o objetivo com este trabalho foi avaliar a eficiência da aplicação do hormônio liberador de gonadotrofinas (GnRH) no dia zero (D0) do protocolo de IATF, a base de estrógeno e progesterona sobre a taxa de penhez por IATF. O experimento foi desenvolvido (...) na Universidade Federal de Uberlândia (UFU), na Fazenda Experimental do Glória, localizada no município de Uberlândia, no estado de Minas Gerais. Foram avaliadas 69 inseminações de vacas leiteiras mestiças, divididas em dois grupos com diferentes protocolos; Controle: sem aplicação de GnRH e Tratamento: aplicação de GnRH no dia zero do protocolo. Todos os animais foram inseminados com sêmen previamente analisado. O diagnóstico de gestação foi realizado 32 dias após a inseminação, com aparelho de ultrassonografia equipado com probe linear transretal de 7,5 MHz. Os dados foram analisados por análise descritiva, sendo avaliado o efeito da relação protocolo e presença de corpo lúteo no início do protocolo e efeito da relação protocolo e ordem de IA Pós-Parto sobre a taxa de concepção. A taxa de concepção após a realização do Protocolo Tratamento foi de 53% (17/32) e do Protocolo Controle foi de 43% (16/37). Portanto, conclui-se que o protocolo de sincronização de vacas leiteiras mestiças com a aplicação de GnRH no dia zero do protocolo resultou em um aumento no número da taxa de concepção de vacas leiteiras mestiças. Palavras-chave: biotecnologia; bovinocultura; hormônio; ovulação; reprodução. ABSTRACT The artificial insemination at fixed time (AIFT) is one of the most studied reproduction biotechnologies in recent years, and the search for a balance between animal physiology and hormonal control fosters a series of studies. Therefore, the objective of this work was to to evaluate the efficiency of gonadotrofine hormone inducer (GnRH) on day zero (D0) of the AIFT protocol, an estrogen and progesterone base on an AIFT rate. The experiment was developed at the Federal University of Uberlândia (UFU), at the Experimental Farm of Glória, located in the municipality of Uberlândia, in the state of Minas Gerais. Were evaluated 69 inseminations of crossbred dairy cows divided into two groups with different protocols; Control: without application of GnRH and Treatment: application of GnRH on day zero of the protocol. All animals were inseminated with previously analyzed semen. The diagnosis of pregnancy was performed 32 days after insemination, with an ultrasound device equipped with a 7.5 MHz transrectal linear probe. The data were analyzed by descriptive analysis, evaluating the effect of the protocol relationship and the presence of corpus luteum at the beginning of the protocol and the effect of the protocol relationship and postpartum AI order on the conception rate. The conception rate after performing of the Treatment Protocol was 53% (17/32) and the Control Protocol was 43% (16/37). Therefore, it is concluded that the synchronization protocol of crossbred dairy cows with the application of GnRH on day zero of the protocol resulted in an increase in the number of conception rates of crossbred dairy cows. Keywords: biotechnology; cattle breeding; hormone; ovulation; reproduction. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ATANASOV, A. S.; DINEVA, J. D.; YOTOV, S. A. Ultrasonic evaluation of uterine involution in Bulgarian Murrah buffalo after administration of oxytocin. Animal Reproduction Science, v.133, p.71-76, 2012. BALL, P. J. H.; PETERS, A. R. Reprodução em bovinos. São Paulo – SP. BARBOSA, C. F. et al. Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo e diagnóstico precoce de gestação em vacas leiteiras mestiças. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 40, p. 79-84, 2011. BARBOSA, C. F. et al. Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo e diagnóstico precoce de gestação em vacas leiteiras mestiças. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, Viçosa, MG, v. 40, n. 1, pág. 79-84, 2011. BARROS, C. M.; FIGUEIREDO, R. A.; PINHEIRO, O. L. Estro, ovulação e dinâmica folicular em zebuínos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, Belo Horizonte, v.19, p. 9-22, 1995. BARUSELLI, P. S. Controle farmacológico do ciclo estral em ruminantes. Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia. Departamento de reprodução animal, Universidade de São Paulo, 2000. BARUSELLI, P. S. et al. Review: Using artificial insemination v. natural service in beef herds. Animal, London, v. 12, p. 45-52, 2018. BEG, M. A.; GINTHER, O. J. Follicle selection in cattle and horses: role of intrafollicular factors. Reproduction, v. 132, pag. 365-377, 2006. BERTAN, C. M.; BINELLI, M.; MADUREIRA, E. H. Caracterização do estro de novilhas cruzadas (Bos taurus indicus x Bos taurus taurus) por radiotelemetria. Brazilian Journal of Veterinary Research and Animal Science, São Paulo, v. 43, n. 6, p. 816-823, 2006. BÓ, G. A.; BARUSELLI, P. S.; MARTINEZ, M. F. Pattern and manipulation of follicular development in Bos indicus cattle. Animal Reproduction Science, v.78, p.307-326, 2003. BÓ, G.; CUTAIA, P. S; BARUSELLI. Programas de inseminación artificial y transferencia de embriones a tiempo fijo. In: SIMPÓSIO INTERNACIONAL DE REPRODUÇÃO APLICADA, 1., 2004, Londrina [Trabalhos apresentados] Cornélio Procópio: Geraembryo, 2004. p. 56-81. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 12 nov. 2022. BORGES, A. M. et al. Dinâmica folicular e momento da ovulação em vacas não lactantes das raças Gir e Nelore durante duas estações do ano. Arquivo Brasileiro de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia. Belo Horizonte, v.56, n.3, p.346-354, 2004. BORGES, A. M. Dinâmica folicular e superovulação em novilhas mestiças tratadas com somatotropina bovina (rBST) e efeito da temperatura na qualidade dos embriões. 1999. Tese de Doutorado. UFV. BURATINI, J. J. Controle endócrino e local da foliculogênese em bovinos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal. Belo Horizonte, v.31, n.2, p.190-196, 2007. CALLEJAS, S. S.; FISIOLOGÍA, D. E. L.; CICLO ESTRAL BOVINO. In: Palma GA. Biotecnología de la reproducción. Mar del Plata: Reprobiotec, 2001. p.37-49. CAMPOS, C. C.; SANTOS, R. M. Taxa de concepção e detecção do estro de retorno após a IATF em vacas Holandesas. Semina: Ciências Agrárias, v. 36, n. 3, suplemento 1, p. 1945- 1954, 2015. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 08 fev. 2022 CARVALHO, B. C. Parâmetros reprodutivos, metabólitos e produção de leite de vacas mestiças Holandês x Zebu submetidas a dois manejos pré-parto. Tese (Doutorado em Medicina Veterinária) - Escola de Veterinária, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, 2009. CASTILHO, E. F. IATF como ferramenta no melhoramento genético de bovinos de leite. In: CASTILHO, E. F. (org.). Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo (IATF) em bovinos leiteiros. 1. ed. Maringá: IEPEC, 2015. p. 148-191. CHEBEL, R. C. et al. Factors affecting conception rate after artificial insemination and pregnancy loss in lactating dairy cows. Animal Reproduction Science, v.84, p.239-255, 2004. CLIMATE DATA ORG. Clima Uberlândia. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 08 fev. de 2022. Curso de Transferência de Embriões, Uberlândia: ASBIA, 2021. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 08 fev. 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Endocrinologia da Reprodução Animal. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução de Bovinos Leiteiros: Aspectos Básicos e Clínicos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro; DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque. Hormônios e Sistema Endócrino na Reprodução Animal. 2020. D’AVILA, C. A. et al. Hormônio utilizados na indução da ovulação em bovinos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal. Belo Horizonte, v. 43, n. 4, p. 797-802, out./dez.2019. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 25 de jan. 2022. DEMÉTRIO, D.G.B. et al. Factors affecting conception rates following artificial insemination or embryo transfer in lactating Holstein cows. Journal of Dairy Science, v.90, p.5073-5082, 2007. DUARTE JUNIOR, M. F. et al. Aspectos relacionados a fisiologia do anestro pós parto em bovinos. Colloquium Agrariae, Cuiabá, v.9, p.43-71, 2013. DUKES, H. H.; SWENSON, M. J.; REECE, W. Dukes fisiologia dos animais domésticos. 12. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan, 2006. FERREIRA, A. M. Reprodução da fêmea bovina: fisiologia aplicada e problemas mais comuns (causas e tratamentos). Juiz de Fora: Edição do Autor, 2010. FINK, G. Gonadotropin secretion and its control. In: KNOBIL, E.; NEILL, J. (ed.), The physiology of reproduction. New York: Raven Press, 1988. p. 1349-1377. FOLMAN, Y. et al. Comparison of methods for the synchronization of estrous cycles in dairy cows. 2. Effects of progesterone and parity on conception. Journal of Dairy Science, v.73, p.2817-2825, 1990. FONSECA, F. A. et al. Reproductive traits of Holsteins and Jerseys. Effects of age, milk yield, and clinical abnormalities on involution of cervix and uterus, ovulation, estrous cycles, detection of estrus, conception rate, and days open. Journal of Dairy Science, v.66, p.1128- 1147, 1983. FORTUNE, J. E.; RIVERA, G. M.; YANG, M. Y. Follicular development: the role of the follicular microenvironment in selectionof the dominant follicle. Animal Reproduction Science, v.82-83, p.109-126, 2004. FURTADO, D. A. et al. Inseminação Artificial em Tempo Fixo em Bovinos de Corte. Revista Científica Eletrônica de Medicina Veterinária, n. 16, pag. 25, 2011. GINTHER O. J. et al. Selection of the dominant follicle in cattle. Biology of Reproduction, v.55, p.1187-1194, 1996. GONZÁLEZ, F. H. D. Introdução à endocrinologia reprodutiva veterinária. Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 2002. 87p. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 12 dez. 2022. HAFEZ, E. S. E.; HAFEZ, B. Ciclos Reprodutivos. In: HAFEZ, E. S. E.; HAFEZ, B. Reprodução Animal, 7. ed. Barueri, SP: Ed. Manole, 2004. cap. 4, p. 55-67. IBGE – INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA. Produção de Leite. IBGE, 2021. LOPES, P. F. R.; RICARDO, P. Y.; LUIZ, C. T. Custos e escala de produção na pecuária leiteira: estudo nos principais estados produtores do Brasil. Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural, 2007. v. 45, n. 3. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 08 fev. 2022. MADUREIRA, E. H. et al. Sincronização com prostágenos. In: I Simpósio Internacional de Reprodução Animal Aplicada. Londrina, Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia. Universidade de São Paulo, p. 117-128, 2004. MARTEL, C. A. Fertility after timed AI insemination in response to a controlled internal drug release (CIDR) insert in lactating dairy cows. 2008. 48f. Thesis (MS Science) Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, USA. MARTIN, I. et al. Características ultrassonográficas do útero de vacas Nelore (Bos taurus indicus) ao longo do ciclo estral. Veterinária e Zootecnia, Botucatu, v.15, n.2, ago., p. 349- 359, 2008. MIRANDA, J. E.C.; FREITAS, A. F. Raças e tipos de cruzamentos para produção de leite. Juíz de Fora: Embrapa Gado de Leite, 2009. Circular Técnica, 98. 12p. MOREIRA, R. J. 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Reprodução em Bovinos, LF livros de veterinária, 2 edição, 2008, 249p. PONCIO, V. A. P. EFICIÊNCIA DE DOIS PROTOCOLOS DE IATF UTILIZANDO BENZOATO DE ESTRADIOL OU GnRH. Nova Odessa. 2021. Disponível em:. Acesso em: 25 de jan. 2022. PURSLEY, J. R.; MEE, M. O.; WILTBANK, M. C. Synchronization of ovulation in dairy cows using PGF2α and GnRH. Theriogenology, v.44, p.915-923, 1995. REICHENBACH, H. D.; MORAES, J. C. F.; NEVES, J. P. 2008. Tecnologia do sêmen e inseminação artificial em bovinos. In: Gonçalves P. B. D.; Figueiredo J. R. e Freitas V. J. F. Biotécnicas aplicadas à reprodução animal. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Ed. Roca. 395 p. ROBINSON, R. S. et al. Corpus luteum-endometriumembryo interactions in the dairy cow: underlying mechanisms and clinical relevance. Reproduction in Domestic Animals, v.43, p.104-12, 2008. Roca, 3ª Edição, 232 p., 2006. RUAS, J. R. M. et al. Vacas F1 Holandês x Zebu: uma opção para sistema de produção de leite em condições tropicais. Inf. 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J.; REECE, W., Dukes Fisiologia dos Animais Domésticos, Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan, 1996. cap. 36, p. 615-644. VALLE, E. R. O ciclo estral de bovinos e métodos de controle. Campo Grande: EMBRAPA – CNPGC, 1991. 24p. (EMBRAPA-CNPGC. Documentos, 48). VISHWANATH, R. Artificial insemination: the state of the art. Theriogenology, v.59, p.571- 584, 2003. WOLFENSON, D. et al. The effect of a GnRH analogue on the dynamics of follicular development and synchronization of estrus in lactating cyclic dairy cows. Theriogenology, v.42, p.633- 644, 1994. YAMADA, K. Desenvolvimento da sincronização da ovulação e inseminação artificial em tempo fixo em vacas leiteiras. Jornal de Reprodução e Desenvolvimento, Nagoya, v. 51, n. 2, pág. 177-186, 2005. (shrink)

In 2006, David Carrier (Carrier, 2006, Museum Skepticism: A History of the Display of Art in Public Galleries. Durham: Duke University Press.) coined the term ‘museum skepticism’ to describe the idea that moving artworks into museum settings strips them of essential facets of their meaning; among art historians, this is better known as ‘decontextualization’, ‘denaturing’, or ‘museumization’. Although they do not usually name it directly, many contemporary debates in the philosophy of art are informed by an inclination towards museum skepticism, (...) from work on aesthetic cognitivism (Feagin, Susan, 1995, “Paintings and their places” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73.2: 260-8.) and contextualism (Danto, Arthur C., 1988, “Artifact and Art”, in ART/ARTIFACT: African Art in Anthropological Collections. Exhibition Catalogue. New York: Center for African Art and Prestel Verlag, 18-32.) to cultural appropriation (Eaton, A. W. and Gaskell, Ivan, 2009, “Do subaltern artifacts belong in art museums?,” The Ethics of Cultural Appropriation, ed. James O. Young and Conrad Brunk, Oxford and Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 235-67), street art (Baldini, Andrea, 2016, “Street Art: A Reply to Riggle” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74.2: 187-91), and the value of authenticity (Korsmeyer, Carolyn, 2016, “Real Old Things” British Journal of Aesthetics, 56.3: 219-31). The very first museum skeptic, however, was Antoine Chrysostôme Quatremère de Quincy (1755-1849). (shrink)

Faulkner a bâti une partie de sa renommée sur la violence parfois controversée de ses récits. Mais l’acte criminel retient moins son attention que son contexte et sa signification morale. L’objet premier de la littérature, selon Faulkner, ce sont les conflits de l’homme, ou du cœur humain, avec eux-mêmes. Le propos de cet article est de mettre en évidence la façon dont Faulkner subvertit le modèle du roman noir, et substitue à l’enjeu traditionnel des histoires policières, celui des faits et (...) de l’identité du coupable, un problème moral. Il donne quelques indications sur la structure générale des rapports crime-culpabilité dans l’œuvre de Faulkner, avant de montrer comment cette thématique se décline dans ses « histoires de crime » au sens propre, c’est-à-dire dans L’Intrus (Intruder in the dust, 1948) et Le Gambit du cavalier, et irrigue la reconstitution faulknérienne de la société du Sud et de l’histoire des États-Unis. (shrink)

Vaccination can protect vaccinated individuals and often also prevent them from spreading disease to other people. This opens up the possibility of getting vaccinated for the sake of others. In fact, altruistic vaccination has recently been conceptualized as a kind of vaccination that is undertaken primary for the benefit of others. In order to better understand the potential role of altruistic motives in people’s vaccination decisions, we conducted two focus group studies with a total of 37 participants. Study 1 included (...) three focus groups on the subject of HPV vaccination for boys. Study 2 included three focus groups on the subject of pertussis and measles vaccination for childcare workers. We found substantial evidence of other-regarding motives across all focus groups, which suggests that altruistic motives could be an important factor when it comes to people’s vaccination decisions. We address the significance of these findings for vaccination policy surrounding HPV vaccination for boys and vaccination for childcare workers. We also extend the findings to normative work on vaccination for the sake of others more generally. (shrink)

Two or more attitudinal states are incoherent if and only if, necessarily, under conditions of full transparency, you are disposed to give up one of them. This is roughly the account of incoherence that has recently been put forward by Alex Worsnip (2018). In this paper, I argue that Worsnip’s account of incoherence is incorrect. Not only does it fail to be fully general (i.e., it does not allow us to assess the coherence of all combinations of attitudes), but it (...) also implies that an agent is necessarily incoherent just in virtue of being in one attitudinal state. (shrink)

Traditionally, logic has been the dominant formal method within philosophy. Are logical methods still dominant today, or have the types of formal methods used in philosophy changed in recent times? To address this question, we coded a sample of philosophy papers from the late 2000s and from the late 2010s for the formal methods they used. The results indicate that the proportion of papers using logical methods remained more or less constant over that time period but the proportion of papers (...) using probabilistic methods was approximately three times higher in the late 2010s than it was in the late 2000s. Further analyses explored this change by looking more closely at specific methods, specific levels of technical engagement, and specific subdisciplines within philosophy. These analyses indicate that the increasing proportion of papers using probabilistic methods was pervasive, not confined to particular probabilistic methods, levels of sophistication, or subdisciplines. (shrink)

A main goal of the neuroscience of consciousness is: find the neural correlate to conscious experiences (NCC). When have we achieved this goal? The answer depends on our operationalization of “NCC.” Chalmers (2000) shaped the widely accepted operationalization according to which an NCC is a neural system with a state which is minimally sufficient (but not necessary) for an experience. A deeper look at this operationalization reveals why it might be unsatisfactory: (i) it is not an operationalization of a correlate (...) for occurring experiences, but of the capacity to experience; (ii) it is unhelpful for certain cases which are used to motivate a search for neural correlates of consciousness; (iii) it does not mirror the usage of “NCC” by scientists who seek for unique correlates; (iv) it hardly allows for a form of comparative testing of hypotheses, namely experimenta crucis. Because of these problems (i–iv), we ought to amend or improve on Chalmers's operationalization. Here, I present an alternative which avoids these problems. This “NCC2.0” also retains some benefits of Chalmers's operationalization, namely being compatible with contributions from extended, embedded, enacted, or embodied accounts (4E-accounts) and allowing for the possibility of non-biological or artificial experiencers. (shrink)

Achieving space situational awareness requires, at a minimum, the identification, characterization, and tracking of space objects. Leveraging the resultant space object data for purposes such as hostile threat assessment, object identification, and conjunction assessment presents major challenges. This is in part because in characterizing space objects we reference a variety of identifiers, components, subsystems, capabilities, vulnerabilities, origins, missions, orbital elements, patterns of life, operational processes, operational statuses, and so forth, which tend to be defined in highly heterogeneous and sometimes inconsistent (...) ways. The Space Domain Ontologies are designed to provide a consensus-based realist framework for formulating such characterizations in a way that is both consistent and computable. Space object data are aligned with classes and relations in a suite of ontologies built around the existing Space Object Ontology. They are stored in a dynamically updated Resource Description Framework triple store, which can be queried to support space situational awareness and the needs of spacecraft operators and analysts. This paper provides an overview of the Space Domain Ontologies and their development and use. It presents the motivation for and advantages of the Space Domain Ontologies, including the benefits they provide for enhancing and maintaining long-term space situational awareness. (shrink)

We lay out the fatalist’s argument, making sure to clarify which dialectical moves are available to the libertarian. We then offer a more robust presentation of Ockhamism, responding to obvious objections and teasing out the implications of the view. At this point, we discuss presentism and eternalism in more detail. We then present our argument for the claim that the libertarian cannot take Ockham’s way out of the fatalism argument unless she rejects presentism. Finally, we consider and dispense with objections (...) to our argument. In the end, it ought to be clear that the libertarian must make a choice between Ockham’s way out and presentism. (shrink)

We should not be creating conscious, humanoid agents but an entirely new sort of entity, rather like oracles, with no conscience, no fear of death, no distracting loves and hates.

This is a supplement to our book "Le tribolazioni del filosofare. Comedia metaphysica ne la quale si tratta de li errori & de le pene de l’Infero". It features an entirely new canto of the poem (originally thought to be lost) along with an extensive commentary. The canto covers the first ring of the circle of the Sullen, which hosts the Adverse to the Possible, and deals with several philosophical questions concerning the metaphysics of modality.

Klein’s account of epistemic justification, infinitism, supplies a novel solution to the regress problem. We argue that concentrating on the normative aspect of justification exposes a number of unpalatable consequences for infinitism, all of which warrant rejecting the position. As an intermediary step, we develop a stronger version of the ‘finite minds’ objection.

The primary aim of this discussion is to present a detailed case study of Descartes’ use of émotion in Les passions de l’ame and in his early writings leading up to that work. A secondary aim is to argue that while Descartes was innovative in suggesting that émotion might be a better keyword for the affective sciences than passion, he did not consistently follow his own advice. His innovation therefore failed in that regard, even though it did inspire later thinkers (...) to explore the distinction between “passion” and “emotion” in their own manner. (shrink)

The history of evolution is a history of development from less to more complex organisms. This growth in complexity of organisms goes hand in hand with a concurrent growth in complexity of environments and of organism-environment relations. It is a concern with this latter aspect of evolutionary development that motivates the present paper. We begin by outlining a theory of organism-environment relations. We then show that the theory can be applied to a range of different sorts of cases, both biological (...) and non-biological, in which objects are lodged or housed within specific environments, or niches. Biological science is interested in types—for example in genotypes, phenotypes, and environment types—in regularities that can serve as the basis for the formulation of laws or general principles. Types, however, can exist only through their corresponding tokens. Our theory of token environments is meant to plug this gap and to provide a first step towards a general theory of causally relevant spatial volumes. (shrink)

Animal rights activists are often accused of caring more about animals than about human beings. How, it is asked, can activists condemn the use of animals in biomedical research—research that improves human health and saves human lives? In this article, I argue that even if animal experimentation might eventually provide cures for many serious diseases, given the present state of the world, we are not justified supporting this research; rather, we ought to devote our limited resources to other forms of (...) humanitarian assistance. (shrink)

The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have a non-maximal degree (...) of subjective coherence. (shrink)

In mathematics, the deductive method reigns. Without proof, a claim remains unsolved, a mere conjecture, not something that can be simply assumed; when a proof is found, the problem is solved, it turns into a “result,” something that can be relied on. So mathematicians think. But is there more to mathematical justification than proof? -/- The answer is an emphatic yes, as I explain in this article. I argue that non-deductive justification is in fact pervasive in mathematics, and that it (...) is in good epistemic standing. (shrink)

The evolutionary advantage of psychological phenomena can be gleaned by comparing them with physical traits that have proven adaptive in other organisms. The present article provides a novel evolutionary explanation of suicide in humans by comparing it with aposematism in insects. Aposematic insects are brightly colored, making them conspicuous to predators. However, such insects are equipped with toxins that cause a noxious reaction when eaten. Thus, the death of a few insects conditions predators to avoid other insects of similar coloration. (...) Analogously, human suicides may increase the credibility of future suicide threats and attempts from others, conveying an evolutionary advantage to the phenotypic expression of suicidal behavior in low-fitness contexts. (shrink)

Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’ – at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by (...) replacing a wide-scope requirement with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa), we do not alter the situations in which a person is fully rational. As a consequence, (iii) the property of full rationality is unable to guide us in determining whether a rational requirement has a wide or a narrow logical scope. We cannot resolve the wide/narrow scope debate by appealing to a theory of fully rational attitudes. This paper argues that (i), (ii) and (iii) are incorrect. Replacing a wide- with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa) can alter the set of circumstances in which a person is fully rational. The property of full rationality is therefore not independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. As a consequence, the property of full rationality can guide us in determining what rationality requires – even in cases where we expect a precise answer. (shrink)

This chapter clarifies that it was the works Giuseppe Peano and his school that first led Russell to embrace symbolic logic as a tool for understanding the foundations of mathematics, not those of Frege, who undertook a similar project starting earlier on. It also discusses Russell’s reaction to Peano’s logic and its influence on his own. However, the chapter also seeks to clarify how and in what ways Frege was influential on Russell’s views regarding such topics as classes, functions, meaning (...) and denotation, etc., and summarizes the correspondence between Frege and Russell and the light it sheds on the philosophical logic of both. (shrink)

Recent work by Peijnenburg, Atkinson, and Herzberg suggests that infinitists who accept a probabilistic construal of justification can overcome significant challenges to their position by attending to mathematical treatments of infinite probabilistic regresses. In this essay, it is argued that care must be taken when assessing the significance of these formal results. Though valuable lessons can be drawn from these mathematical exercises (many of which are not disputed here), the essay argues that it is entirely unclear that the form of (...) infinitism that results meets a basic requirement: namely, providing an account of infinite chains of propositions qua reasons made available to agents. (shrink)

One important foundation of Buddhist ethics is a commitment to nonviolence. My aim in this paper is to work out the implications of this commitment with regard to the treatment of offenders. Given that punishment involves the intentional infliction of harm, I argue that the practice of punishment is incompatible with the principle of nonviolence. The core moral teaching of the Buddha is to conquer evil with goodness, and it is reconciliation, rather than punishment, that conforms to this teaching. I (...) argue that a commitment to nonviolence requires not only that we refrain from inflicting intentional harm, but that we refrain from inflicting unnecessary harm, and that this has important implications concerning the practice of incapacitation. I analyze the concept of harm and argue that the Buddhist understanding of this notion leads to the conclusion that none of the standard justifications for punishment are compatible with the principle of nonviolence, properly understood. (shrink)

This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process-requirements upon us. It has been argued that process-requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process-requirements. First, process-requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree (...) of morality, rationality or prudence. However, I argue that these two functions are unable to show the existence of process-requirements. Instead, I propose a different essential function for process-requirements: they are necessary for attributing the correct degree of rationality, morality or prudence to a subject who is not entirely rational, moral or prudent. This function, I argue, necessitates the existence of process-requirements. (shrink)

This essay argues that reparations for wrongs by one's ancestors can be justified. Differential benefits to those descended from victims of one's ancestors is discrimination which can be justified by one's right to be partial to one's ancestors, doing what they, with clearer thinking, would have done--namely compensating their victims. So, while there is no obligation to discriminate, one has a right to, in virtue of one's partiality towards one's ancestors.

Hussain claims that ethical consumers are subject to democratic requirements of morality, whereas ordinary price/quality consumers are exempt from these requirements. In this paper, we demonstrate that Hussain’s position is incoherent, does not follow from the arguments he offers for it, and entails a number of counterintuitive consequences.

Bertrand Russell was one of the best-known proponents of logicism: the theory that mathematics reduces to, or is an extension of, logic. Russell argued for this thesis in his 1903 The Principles of Mathematics and attempted to demonstrate it formally in Principia Mathematica (PM 1910–1913; with A. N. Whitehead). Russell later described his work as a further “regressive” step in understanding the foundations of mathematics made possible by the late 19th century “arithmetization” of mathematics and Frege’s logical definitions of arithmetical (...) concepts. The logical system of PM sought to improve on earlier attempts by solving the contradictions found in, e.g., Frege’s system, by employing a theory of types. In this article, I also consider and critically evaluate the most common objections to Russell’s logicism, including the claim that it is undermined by Gödel’s incompleteness results, and Putnam's charge of “if-thenism”. I suggest that if we are willing to accept a slightly revisionist account of what counts as a mathematical truth, these criticisms do not obviously refute Russell’s claim to have established that mathematical truths generally are a species of logical truth. (shrink)

From the dictum "ought implies can", it has been argued that no account of belief's normativity can avoid the unpalatable result that, for unbelievable propositions such as "It is raining and nobody believes that it is raining", one ought not to believe them even if true. In this article, I argue that this move only succeeds on a faulty assumption about the conjunction of doxastic "oughts.".

The thesis that rationality consists in the straight-forward maximization of utility has not lacked critics. Typically, however, detractors reject the Humean picture of rationality upon which it seems based; they seek to emancipate reason from the tyranny of the passions. It is, then, noteworthy when an attack on this thesis comes from ‘within the ranks.’David Gauthier's paper ‘Reason and Maximization’ is just such an attack; and for this reason, among others, it is interesting. It is not successful, though. In defense (...) of this conclusion, we shall begin by relating the essentials of Gauthier's argument. Then we shall examine in some detail Gauthier's claim that the principle of straighforward max-imization fails to be self-supporting. We shall argue that Gauthier's defense of this claim is at best incomplete. Finally, we shall show that the fact that a normative principle is self-subverting or non-self-supporting does not entail that the principle is defective. (shrink)

Within the debate concerning reason and rationality, instrumental incoherence was for a long time conceived of as the paradigm of irrationality. However, with the emergence of the so-called ‘bootstrapping objection’ and the debate concerning the ‘scope’ of rational requirements, the innocuous status of the normative significance of (instrumental) coherence became subject to. This led to a paradigmatic shift in how to understand the relationship between rational requirements and normativity. While there now exists considerable doubt that rational requirements are normative, it (...) is commonly agreed that one’s normative point of view is a key feature of one’s rationality. Here the question is not only if one can hold a particular normative judgement and still be rational; what is significant too is whether your normative outlook coheres appropriately with your motivation. In fact, it is now commonly agreed that rationality requires us to intend to make the world fit with our first-personal ought beliefs. Enkrasia (i.e. coherence between your normative views and your motivation) is thus seen as a rational ideal and as a source of rational requirements. Nevertheless, many elementary questions regarding the application, content, and significance of an enkrasia-requirement remain unanswered, or subject to debate. This special issue on ‘The Nature of the Enkratic Requirement of Rationality’ aims to answer some of these fundamental questions. (shrink)

Worker well-being is a hot topic in organizations, consultancy and academia. However, too often, the buzz about worker well-being, enthusiasm for new programs to promote it and interest to research it, have not been accompanied by universal enthusiasm for scientific measurement. Aim to bridge this gap, we address three questions. To address the question ‘What is worker well-being?’, we explain that worker well-being is a multi-facetted concept and that it can be operationalized in a variety of constructs. We propose a (...) four-dimensional taxonomy of worker well-being constructs to illustrate the concept’s complexity and classify ten constructs within this taxonomy. To answer the question ‘How can worker well-being constructs be measured?’, we present two aspects of measures: measure obtrusiveness (i.e., the extent to which obtaining a measure interferes with workers’ experiences) and measure type (i.e., closed question survey, word, behavioral and physiological). We illustrate the diversity of measures across our taxonomy and uncover some hitherto under-appreciated avenues for measuring worker well-being. Finally, we address the question ‘How should a worker well-being measure be selected?’ by discussing conceptual, methodological, practical and ethical considerations when selecting a measure. We summarize these considerations in a short checklist. It is our hope that with this study researchers – working in organizations, in academia or both – will feel more competent to find effective strategies for the measurement worker well-being and eventually make policies and choices with a better understanding of what drives worker well-being. (shrink)

This paper seeks to indicate some connections between a major philosophi- cal project of the seventeenth century, the conception of a mathesis universalis, and the practice of baroque poetry. I shall argue that these connections consist in a peculiar view of language and systems of notation which was particularly common in European baroque culture and which provided the necessary conceptual background for both poetry and the mathesis universalis.

There is tension between commonly held views concerning phenomenal imagery on the one hand and our first-person epistemic access to it on the other. This tension is evident in many individual issues and experiments in philosophy and psychology (e.g. inattentional and change blindness, the speckled hen, dream coloration, visual periphery). To dissolve it, we can give up either (i) that we lack full introspective access to the phenomenal properties of our imagistic experiences, or (ii) that phenomenal imagery is fully determined, (...) or (iii) that phenomenal imagery does not exist. Which option is preferable? I explore the feasibility of option (ii) in more details by distinguishing between di erent kinds of indeterminacy. One of the most often proclaimed versions of indeterminacy is tied to Representationalism. However, I argue that in this context, Representationalism appears to be the least satisfying option, for which I give ten reasons. By abduction, we should reject Representationalism in favour of (i) or (iii)—the most parsimonious option being eliminativism, and the most conservative being the rejection of privileged access. The decision between these two, however, should be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on which is most adequate given the data. I illustrate this with the comparison between visual agnosia and Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. (shrink)

In this commentary, I suggest expanding the deliberative aspects of critical care policy development in two ways. First, critical-care policy development should expand the scope of deliberation by leaving fewer issues up to expertise or private choice. For instance. it should allow deliberation about the relevance of age, disability, social position, and psychological well-being to allocation decisions. Second, it should broaden both the set of costs considered and the set of stakeholders represented in the deliberative process. In particular, it should (...) consider efforts to reduce the cost of end-of-life care and to redirect resources away from the provision of costly interventions, and should expand the set of individuals included in deliberation to include stakeholders outside the health-care system. (shrink)

This chapter provides a gentle introduction to contextual emergence and its implications for the structure of the material world as well as implications for meaning in our world.

Russell is often taken as a forerunner of the Quinean position that “to be is to be the value of a bound variable”, whereupon the ontological commitment of a theory is given by what it quantifies over. Among other reasons, Russell was among the first to suggest that all existence statements should be analyzed by means of existential quantification. That there was more to Russell’s metaphysics than what existential quantifications come out as true is obvious in the earlier period where (...) Russell still made a distinction between existence and being/subsistence. But even the later Russell, including that of the Logical Atomism lectures period, would not have understood ontological questions to be first and foremost questions of quantification. He would take fundamentality to be important too, which explains in part his assertions to the effect the the values of individual variables have a reality not attributable to values of higher-order variables, even ineliminable higher-order variables. (shrink)

Edward Feser defends the ‘Neo-Platonic proof ’ for the existence of the God of classical theism. After articulating the argument and a number of preliminaries, I first argue that premise three of Feser’s argument—the causal principle that every composite object requires a sustaining efficient cause to combine its parts—is both unjustified and dialectically ill-situated. I then argue that the Neo-Platonic proof fails to deliver the mindedness of the absolutely simple being and instead militates against its mindedness. Finally, I uncover two (...) tensions between Trinitarianism and the Neo-Platonic proof. (shrink)

A brief article introducing *One True Logic*. The book argues that there is one correct foundational logic and that it is highly infinitary.

Daniel Dennett has offered a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being the proper object of our moral commitment, that is, for something's being a person. Strict application of these largely pragmatic conditions, however, would result in a moral community with quite a surprising membership roster, because of both who is on it and who isn't. The problem is that "your" being a person should amount to more than a function of "my" goals and cleverness.

Honors Research: PPE @ UPenn | This thesis seeks to address some of the most central questions to the fields of political philosophy and political economy. How can social order and government develop from anarchy under standard economic assumptions of rationality, where all agents act strictly in their own interests? What are the deontological limits to the State’s use of force such that political legitimacy is maintained, and how do these ethical boundaries of government relate to moral obligations conferred upon (...) individuals? Finally, what sets of policies and social institutions ought the State implement to achieve the best welfare outcomes for a society, and is there a necessary conflict between policy consequentialism and deontological ethics? This thesis will first show that a laissez-faire capitalist social order spontaneously emerges from the State of Nature as a result of mutual self-interest between rational agents, with the institution of government being a mere product of market forces that is best modeled as a locally-monopolized, excludable, collective entity with global competition. Then, this thesis will defend a theory of natural rights on the basis that persons are normatively separate, before establishing that laissez-faire capitalism and its contractual form of government are uniquely in compliance with these universal moral standards of conduct that predate the institution of any state. Finally, it will be argued in this thesis that the key tenets of laissez-faire capitalism - strong individual rights to life, liberty, and property - produce maximal human welfare from both individualist and collectivist aggregations, before such conclusions are translated into a foundation for limited government. These arguments serve to solidify libertarianism as both the dominant political philosophy and the globally convergent equilibrium of political organization, while also demonstrating that laissez-faire capitalism is the optimal form of social order. (shrink)

Is a phenomenal pain a conscious primitive or composed of more primitive phenomenal states? Are pain experiences necessarily or only contingently unpleasant? Here, I sketch how to answer such questions concerning intra-phenomenal metaphysics using the example of pain and unpleasantness. Arguments for a symmetrical metaphysical independence of phenomenal pain and unpleasant affect are presented, rejecting a composite view like the IASP definition and dimensional views. The motivating intuition of these views is explained by common binding mechanisms in consciousness and characterized (...) as fallacious if generalized. There are, however, underlying commonalities between pain perception and unpleasant affect, e.g. formal content or evolutionary ancestry. (shrink)

In this paper, I counter arguments to the effect that pacifism must be irrational which cite hypothetical situations in which violence is necessary to prevent a far greater evil. I argue that for persons similar to myself, for whom such scenarios are extremely unlikely, promoting in oneself the disposition to avoid violence in any circumstances is more likely to lead to better results than not cultivating such a disposition just for the sake of such unlikely eventualities.

Does a coherentist version of rationality issue requirements on states? Or does it issue requirements on processes? This paper evalu- ates the possibility of process-requirements. It argues that there are two possible definitions of state- and process-requirements: a satisfaction- based definition and a content-based definition. I demonstrate that the satisfaction-based definition is inappropriate. It does not allow us to uphold a clear-cut distinction between state- and process-requirements. We should therefore use a content-based definition of state- and pro- cess-requirements. However, a (...) content-based definition entails that ra- tionality does not issue process-requirements. Content-based process- requirements violate the principle that ‘rationality requires’ implies ‘can satisfy’. The conclusion of this paper therefore amounts to a radical re- jection of process-requirements of rationality. (shrink)

Context — Children and adults with psychopathic traits and conduct or oppositional defiant disorder demonstrate poor decision making and are impaired in reversal learning. However, the neural basis of this impairment has not previously been investigated. Furthermore, despite high comorbidity of psychopathic traits and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, to our knowledge, no research has attempted to distinguish neural correlates of childhood psychopathic traits and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Objective—To determine the neural regions that underlie the reversal learning impairments in children with psychopathic traits (...) plus conduct or oppositional defiant disorder. Design — Case-control study. Setting — Government clinical research institute. Participants — Forty-two adolescents aged 10 to 17 years: 14 with psychopathic traits and oppositional defiant disorder or conduct disorder, 14 with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder only, and 14 healthy controls. Main Outcome Measure — Blood oxygenation level–dependent signal as measured via functional magnetic resonance imaging during a probabilistic reversal task. Results — Children with psychopathic traits showed abnormal responses within the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Brodmann area 10) during punished reversal errors compared with children wit hattention deficit/hyperactivity disorder and healthy children (P < .05 corrected for multiple comparisons). Conclusions — To our knowledge, this study provides the first evidence of abnormal ventromedial prefrontal cortex responsiveness in children with psychopathic traits and demonstrates this dysfunction was not attributable to comorbid attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. These findings suggest that reversal learning impairments in patients with developmental psychopathic traits relate to abnormal processing of reinforcement information. (shrink)

Suppose rationality requires you to A if you believe you ought to A. Suppose you believe that you ought to A. How can you satisfy this requirement? One way seems obvious. You can satisfy this requirement by A-ing. But can you also satisfy it by stopping to believe that you ought to A? Recently, it has been argued that this second option is not a genuine way of satisfying the above requirement. Conditional requirements of rationality do not have two ‘symmetric’, (...) but only one ‘asymmetric’ satisfaction condition. This paper explores the consequences of this argument for a theory of the requirements of rationality. I seek to show that thisview conflicts with another powerful intuition about the requirements of rationality, i.e. ‘rational consistency’: if rationality requires you to X, then it is not the case that rationality requires you to not-X. I shall conclude that ‘asymmetric’ satisfying is based on a misleading intuition, for which we should not sacrifice ‘rational consistency’. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Theaetetus establishes conditions on objects of knowledge which entail that only of Forms can there be knowledge. Plato's arguments for this are valid. The principles needed to make Plato's premises true will turn out to have deep connection with important parts of Plato's over-all theory, and to have consequences which Plato, in the middle dialogues, seems to welcome on other grounds as well.